Co-opting Capitalism: Avatar and the Thing Itself
“Our motto must be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analyzing the
mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself… It will then become
evident that the world has long dreamed of possessing something of which it has
only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality… It is not a question of
drawing a great mental dividing line between past and future, but of realizing the
thoughts of the past.”
– Karl Marx1
I
The
mainstream is polluted. It’s clogged with the rot of a society that never stops
cannibalizing itself. Nothing can live here anymore. Even protest anthems have
become advertising jingles. And activists are no longer shocked to see our
enemies appropriate the things we once found resonant. For many radicals who
grew up – as I did – at the end of history, the decisive moment came when Bob
Dylan’s The Times They Are a-Changin’ became the score to a 1996 Bank of Montreal ad campaign.
We alternated between
outrage and bewilderment when we noticed that the decisive line “your sons and
your daughters are beyond your command” had been redacted from the version used
by the bank. On first blush, the gesture was straight up censorship, an attempt
to deny the defiance that Dylan had intended to foment. But when I looked
closer, something else came into view. The redaction also suggested that the
song could not be swallowed whole. For those that still remembered what it used
to sound like, the bank’s remix
filled the song with meaning. Somehow, by trying to defang it, capitalism made
the worn-out tune precious again. In 2007, I had a similar experience when,
against my better judgment, I sat through Juno until the very end. Watching the credits roll, I
snapped to attention as I heard Kimya Dawson’s Loose Lips performed with the line “fuck Bush and fuck this
war” relegated to oblivion.
II
What
is the relationship between capitalism and forms of cultural radicalism? For
many, the answer is simple: the mainstream takes without giving. Our only hope
is to save ourselves by going underground. But when we follow our desires –
when we cultivate alternatives to drowning in pabulum – we discover that our
efforts are easily co-opted. Macabre and vampiric, capitalism gains vitality by
devouring all that exceeds it. Every beating heart is thus fair game. Pulled
into the market, our imaginative élan hits us like a boomerang. The process, as
we experience it, is by now familiar. First, we carve out spaces where we might
really live despite the deadening
weight of cultural entropy. Then, as though it had been waiting for us to make
our move, the market catches on and turns the music of rebellion into Top 40
bubblegum. Godard’s courageous cinematic experiments become the playbook for
advertisers struggling to stay one step ahead of the dull commodities they
peddle.
Is it any wonder that
we’re so protective of our scenes? Suspicious of tourists, we set up tribunals
to scrutinize the brave or curious few who wander in off the street. Only
slowly do we warm to them. This would be fine if it weren’t for the fact that,
officially, we’re a proselytizing bunch committed to broadening our reach. But
gathered on this beach of the tumid mainstream, we can’t help but adopt the
closed postures of the frightened and outcast. On guard against those that
would cheapen what we hold most dear, we cling tightly to all that defines us
so that it doesn’t get plucked from our hands.
If radical politics was
just about giving voice to the most complete version of ourselves we could
muster, these postures – although ultimately self-defeating – might at least
make sense. But this has never been all that we espouse. And, by standing on
guard against the loathsome mainstream, we end up cutting ourselves off from
many of the very people with whom our movements must connect. It’s a pressing
contradiction, and one that has yet to be resolved. Hardly surprising, then,
that a film like The Matrix,
which deals with this problem directly, should continue to resonate more than
ten years after the fact.
The Matrix is a
system, Neo. That system is our enemy. But when you’re inside, you look around.
What do you see? Business
people, teachers, lawyers, carpenters. The very minds of the people we are
trying to save. But until we do, these people are still a part of that system,
and that makes them our enemy.
Intellectually, we
understand the need to connect with people beyond our scenes. Nevertheless, we
find it difficult to start from the standpoint of the world as we find it. This
is because we perceive the content of this world to be indistinguishable from
its master, our enemy. Hating capitalism, we subsequently find those who seem
at home amidst its wonders to be suspect. Seduced by Manichean simplicity or
emboldened by the relative size and stability of our scenes, we lose sight of
the fact that capitalism itself is contradictory. And more: people’s current
allegiances to mainstream cultural forms may very well arise from capitalism’s
constant appeal to that which lies beyond it. If this is the case, then it’s
necessary to come to terms with the deep ambivalence underlying people’s
identification with the status quo. This ambivalence is both a terrain of
struggle and an invitation to engage. But seduced by our scenes and
contemptuous of the mainstream, we often miss it.
III
Considered
together, the ambivalence underlying people’s identification with the status
quo and capitalism’s unending co-optation of radical content suggests that “the
mainstream” may actually harbour a secret desire to connect with us. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the profit
motive has led advertisers to focus less on their product’s restricted use
value and more on the promise it was said to fulfill. The success of this
approach became incontestable when, in 1929, Edward Bernays staged a publicity
stunt designed to get women to become smokers. Enlisting a group of young women
to defy taboo by lighting up cigarettes while marching in New York City’s
Easter Day parade, and prompting the press to describe their act as a
declaration of freedom, Bernays effectively bound the commodity to the promise.
Immediately afterward, the number of women smokers increased dramatically.
Sublime though it may be,
smoking would never yield the freedom it promised. Nevertheless, as a kind of
compensatory proxy for women’s seemingly unattainable desires, the cigarette
provided a cathartic deferral or partial resolution. And though people may have
come to the realization – as they have with many commodities – that the idea of smoking is more pleasurable than smoking itself,
the absence of plausible alternatives for realizing the promise is often enough
to keep people hooked. In this way, a psychic addiction underwrites a chemical
one.2 However, people’s acceptance of capitalism’s limited
horizon should not be confused with the idea that they find the world bound by
that horizon to be sufficient. If anything, feelings of lack seem to grow apace
with disposable income. Nevertheless, allegiance to capitalism arises primarily
from the fact that – at present – capitalism alone offers tangible answers to
the question: how will my desires be realized, even if only partially?
This is not “false
consciousness.” Rather, it is practical consciousness for those with little
reason to believe that the word “reality” could pertain to anything other than
the irrefutable – capitalist – world they encounter with their senses. The
trick for radicals, then, is not to denounce mainstream consumption or the
desires that stimulate it but rather to reveal the consumed object’s inadequacy
when measured against the desire it promises to fulfill. As with the
19th-century movement of industrial workers, which needed to move from Luddite
iconoclasm to factory council appropriation before it could consummate its
struggle, contemporary radicals need to overcome our ascetic repudiation of the
commodity so that we might engage its generative contradictions directly.
IV
We’re
still a long way off. Advertisers continue to be far better than us at
recognizing that it’s the secret desire for an actual revolution that leads
consumers to identify with a “revolutionary” new product (a product denoting a
freedom it will always fail to yield).3
Still, it can’t go on forever, and the contradictions underlying capitalism’s
strategy of stimulating desire show signs of nearing their threshold. With the
commodity’s inability to fulfill the promises it whispers becoming increasingly
apparent, advertisers have upped the ante by supplementing their declarations
with visual citations drawn directly from the archive of revolutionary
movements. This dynamic reached what may have been its acme when, in 1999,
Britain’s Churches Advertising Network issued a poster that forged a connection
between Jesus Christ and Che Guevara. Aimed at generating interest in Easter
mass, the poster draws on Alberto Korda’s iconic Guerrillero Heróico (1960) to stimulate the viewer’s identification with
Christ as a revolutionary figure.
The result is stunning. It
made no difference that, if followed to its logical conclusion, the posited
identity between Christ and Che should have compelled parishioners to turn against the very church being
promoted in the ad. Storming the altar, they should have found it nearly impossible to suppress the urge
to cry out (as Christ did when he cast the moneychangers out of the temple),
“my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of
thieves!” None of this happened. As a compensatory proxy mobilized in response
to a world defined by restricted horizons, “Che Jesus” effectively positioned
the church itself as the actualization of Christ’s revolutionary commitment. By
the Churches Advertising Network’s own admission, the campaign was very
successful.4
On the surface, it may
seem that the ad’s resonance owed more to its recapitulation of postmodernism’s
addiction to irony than to its citation of content drawn from the revolutionary
archive. However, such a characterization ignores the fact that, today, “irony”
itself operates as a strategy for the organization and management of desire. In
other words, irony makes it possible to reiterate stories infused with longing
without acknowledging their implications.5 By forging a path that leads imperceptibly from
enunciation to disavowal, irony saves us from having to come to terms with the
demands placed upon us by the stories we continue to love in spite of
ourselves. In the case of “Che Jesus,” Christ becomes harmless through his
ironic association with Che. This allows viewers to embrace the image without
having to own up to the demands it places upon them. Meanwhile, the fact that
Alberto Korda’s original photo has continued to resonate precisely on account
of its own overt Christological citation disappears entirely.
V
With
minor variations, this process can be detected underlying all mainstream
citations of radical culture. These citations stimulate a longing to consume by
fostering identification with promises that can, in fact, never be realized
through consumption. However, while this process underwrites capitalism’s
uncanny ability to endlessly reproduce itself through substitution and
deferral, it also constitutes a gamble. By speaking in the name of that which
lies beyond it, capitalism whets an appetite that it cannot satisfy. The trick,
then, is to intensify dissatisfaction with partial resolutions without giving
up on desire. This does not mean searching for more appropriate substitute
objects. On the contrary, it means recognizing – as Max Horkheimer did – that
“the critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life contains
simultaneously their condemnation.”6
To be sure, by making
consumption the only means by which promises can be effectively realized,
capitalism continues to maintain the upper hand. And, so long as it’s able to
“resolve” the inevitable disappointment it generates by substituting new
commodities for ones that have lost their lustre, it will continue to do so.
But despite this apparent stability, we should not lose sight of the fact that
the whole system is built on a fault line. One of our most pressing challenges,
then, is to determine how to decouple the desire that stimulates consumption
from the consumable object in which it gets trapped. This process, which Walter
Benjamin considered analogous to splitting the atom,7 is crucial since it simultaneously meets two central
objectives of the class struggle. First, it helps to release the tremendous
human energy trapped in the ruins of our society (a society that, despite
constant cinematic anticipation, has yet to collapse) so that it might be
channelled into the process of revolutionary change. Second, by releasing and
redirecting this energy, it deprives capitalism of the blood upon which it
feeds.
How do we split the atom?
To begin, we must first develop a new attentiveness to all the implicit and
explicit citations of radical content in mainstream culture. This means
recognizing those radical themes that sometimes find latent expression in
cultural artifacts whose manifest content appears to be apolitical. It also
means not rejecting those more overt citations that sometimes crop up in
“political” artifacts that nevertheless strike us as lamentable. Of these two
tasks, contemporary radicals have found it far easier to engage in the former.
The recent fascination with zombie movies (which, as a genre, oscillate between
extreme left and extreme right perspectives)8 can be understood at least in part as an expression
of our newly intensified desire and capacity to find traces of the political
within the cultural. Nevertheless, and in stark contrast to this intellectual
generosity, it remains difficult for radicals to relate to mainstream social
artifacts that express “political” content directly but in a fashion considered
to be inadequate.
VI
When
Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11
came out in 2004, radical commentators did all they could to outflank it on the
left. Activist blogs and online news sources quickly filled up with scathing
indictments. Among the film’s most vocal detractors, journalist Robert Jensen
condemned both Moore and the many leftists who spoke highly of his film. That
they could do so, Jensen intoned, “should tell us something about the
impoverished nature of the left in this country.”9 This was because, in his estimation, Fahrenheit
9/11 was “a bad movie.” The
substance of Jensen’s critique had to do with the film’s recourse to what he
called “subtle racism” and to its unselfconscious reiteration of dangerous
American myths.
With respect to the film’s
subtle racism, Jensen highlighted
how – in an effort to make visible the de facto unilateralism of Bush’s war – Moore’s depiction of
the “coalition of the willing” drew heavily on images emphasizing the
technologically backward character of the endorsing nations. Of greater
significance, Jensen also pointed out that the “victims” of the domestic war on
terror featured in the film were overwhelmingly white. According to Jensen,
this decision effectively erased the experiences of those countless many –
primarily people of colour – that were interrogated and detained in the months
following 9/11.
These aspects of the film
are indeed troubling. But what bothered Jensen most was that, in the film’s
concluding scene, Moore seemed to reiterate the myth that the American military
was a global force for good. Speaking of those who are forced by limited
prospects to join the military, Moore recounts how “they offer to give up their
lives so that we can be free … and all they ask in return is that we not send
them in harm’s way unless it’s necessary.” In light of the debacle in Iraq, he
asks, “will they ever trust us again?” According to Jensen, “it is no doubt
true that many who join the military believe they will be fighting for
freedom.” Nevertheless,
we must distinguish between the mythology that many internalize and may
truly believe, and the reality of the role of the U.S. military. The film
includes some comments by soldiers questioning that very claim, but Moore’s
narration implies that somehow a glorious tradition of U.S. military endeavors
to protect freedom has now been sullied by the Iraq War.
The capacity to read
what’s implied is a good skill. However, in this case, Jensen’s desire to
condemn seems to have prevented him from recognizing that Moore’s conclusion
may very well encourage viewers to conclude that the soldiers won’t trust “us” again. In its very structure, the film’s
conclusion sets up a conflict between the myth (and the promise it extends) and
the brutal reality that will always tarnish it. In light of this contradiction,
the question thus becomes: if we desire the promise of the myth that all might
live with freedom, and if US militarism is not the means by which this promise
will be realized, then what must we do to assure that it becomes a reality?
Although it’s impossible to tell whether or not this was Moore’s intention,10 the conflict between myth and reality can easily be
extracted from the material provided.
However, rather than
seeking to “complete” the film by recognizing (as Horkheimer did) that the
critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life contains
simultaneously their condemnation, activist critiques like Jensen’s aimed
instead at rendering it politically inadmissible. Mainstream audiences didn’t
get the memo; from the 20-minute standing ovation it received when it premiered
at Cannes to the staggering number of copies sold when released on DVD a year later, Fahrenheit 9/11 resonated strongly with millions of viewers. It remains the
top-grossing documentary of all time.
Radicals often responded
by asserting that we were to the left of Michael Moore. We revelled in our
scathing indictments, which proved – once and for all – that our vision was
purer than Moore’s (as though this was a challenge; as though this was the challenge). Meanwhile, most viewers, deeply affected
by the film, neither knew nor cared what we thought. We were talking to
ourselves. Again. But what form of critical engagement could have pushed
viewers to “complete” the film? By what means might people learn to decouple
their desire for freedom from the myth in which it’s currently ensnared?
There’s no easy answer to
this question. And any resolution will require more than merely intellectual
interventions. Nevertheless, the uncertainty we confront whenever we’re forced
to consider what must be done
should not prevent us from lamenting the fact that, in this case, we didn’t do
much at all. Enamoured by our social marginality, many of us retreated to our
blogs. If it occurred to us to leaflet people after the show, we rarely got our
act together to do so.
VII
The
radical scene’s tendency to celebrate its own marginality has made it difficult
for us to relate to significant mass cultural phenomena. When, by chance,
millions of people end up liking what we like, we take it as a sign that we’ve
done something wrong. How, we ask, could people so invested in the comfort of
their own ransacked lives identify with cultural offerings tuned to the pitch
of a wheezing tear gas canister? True, we have acknowledged a few crossover
successes: Bruce Springsteen remained cool even after Ronald Reagan declared
that he liked him, and Rage Against the Machine was welcomed to the stage of
the Los Angeles anti-DNC protest in 2000 even though they’d undoubtedly been
the soundtrack to countless frat house conflagrations. But despite these
occasional signs of generosity, we have yet to figure out how to co-opt
capitalism.
If this problem was clear
before, the release of Avatar
during the final weeks of 2009 made it crystallographic. True to form, many
radicals have condemned the film. And this is a shame, since condemnation will
not bring us closer to understanding why Avatar has stimulated more audience interest than any other
Hollywood blockbuster in history. Whether measured in terms of box office
receipts or the tremendous amount of online discussion it has inspired, it’s
useless to deny the film’s mass cultural resonance. Indeed, both the intensity
and sheer volume of popular discussions suggest that it has successfully
overcome the restricted bounds of “entertainment.” Less than a month after its
release, we reached a moment of decisive inversion. The film itself became the
stable referent. People began to interpret their life through Avatar’s lens.
Following a story that
appeared on CNN in January, The Huffington Post reported that Avatar-related online discussion boards had become ad hoc
peer counselling hubs. On these boards, filmgoers struggled with the
unforgiving greyness of the world they confronted upon leaving the theatre.
These feelings of dread were compounded by the dysphoria that arose from their
identification with the Na’vi as ego ideal (the image of themselves as they
ought to be). And, because the film presents the Na’vi as natural and
harmonious extensions of the world they inhabit, people’s struggle for the realization
of their ego ideal has put them into direct conflict with their own wasted
lives. According to The Huffington
Post, one viewer described how
they had been depressed ever since they saw the film. “Watching the wonderful
world of Pandora and all the Na’vi made me want to be one of them,” they
lamented.
11
A response such as this
one may seem idiosyncratic – testament more to the personal troubles of a
science fiction shut-in than to any real social issue. Nevertheless, it’s
important to consider how, whether or not this was its intention, Avatar helped to set up a conflict between many people’s
persistent but unrealized desire for happiness and the imperfect world in which
they live. To be sure, the overwhelming response to conflicts of this kind has
been therapeutic or managerial. Nevertheless, the fact that it’s experienced as
“conflict” at all should alert us to its importance as a site of struggle. In
order to orient to this site, it’s useful to consider Walter Benjamin’s
analysis of what, following Freud, he identified as wish images. Describing how
people’s utopian longing can help to jumpstart the process of social
transformation, Benjamin recounted how “corresponding in the collective
consciousness to the forms of the new means of production … are images in which
the new is intermingled with the old.”
These images are
wishful fantasies, and in them the collective seeks both to preserve and to
transfigure the inchoateness of the social product and the deficiencies in the
social system of production… These tendencies direct the visual imagination,
which has been activated by the new, back to the primeval past. In the dream in
which, before the eyes of each epoch, that which is to follow appears in
images, the latter appears wedded to elements from prehistory, that is, of a
classless society.12
When applied to Cameron’s
film, Benjamin’s analysis suggests that, by operating in the fantastical
register, Avatar proposes a
resolution to contemporary earthly concerns by staging a return to the site of
trauma. As noted by several commentators, this site is none other than the
conquest of the Western hemisphere by European powers. Returning to this point
with the assistance of allegory, the viewer is given the opportunity to imagine
how (if they play their cards right) this time the outcome might be different.
Is Avatar, then, simply an over-financed rehearsal of Dances
With Wolves, Pocahontas, and The Last Samurai as many commentators have proposed? No. What
distinguishes these three films from Avatar is that, as historical narratives obliged to adhere
to the contexts that fill them with meaning, they all end in failure. Barring a
revisionism so grand as to overwrite the advent of the modern world system, it
could not be otherwise.13 And
so, while Kevin Costner’s improbable but deeply affective bond with the Sioux
may have redeemed him, it could
not save the people of the plains from eradication. Only Avatar – precisely because of its status as speculative
fiction – is able to envision redemption as a process with a definitive,
resolved, end.14
As wish image, the Na’vi
stimulate people’s longing for a better world by standing in as fulfillment of
the unrealized promise of the (mythic) past.15 As in Benjamin’s account, this fulfillment takes the
form of a fusion of the old and the new. In the film, this fusion is made
explicit through the literal connectivity shared by the creatures of Pandora.
The Na’vi transfer data through the organic equivalent of fibre-optic cables
growing directly from their skulls. James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis thus finds
imaginative concretion through one of the internet era’s central fantasies.
Amplifying their
significance, these connective links are also explicitly eroticized. Not only
is Sully, the film’s protagonist, told to avoid playing with its tendrils lest
he go blind, the leaked script for the extended love scene (not shown in the
cinematic release) has the depicted characters “linking up.” And so, while
immersion in collaborative networks is normally understood – especially since
the publication of Civilization and its Discontents in 1930 – as demanding the suspension of pleasure,
on Pandora connectivity and pleasure magically coincide. In this way, Avatar rehearses an image of redemption that echoes Herbert
Marcuse’s greatest hopes from 1955’s Eros and Civilization. It’s no wonder
that – whatever its distance from genuine erotic experience – some online
commentators have begun speculating about the possibility of Na’vi porn.
The wish image’s social
significance arises from its ability to give the desire for redemption a
concrete referent. Nevertheless, in and of itself, the wish image does not
suggest anything about the means
by which redemption might be achieved. And so, while it stimulates desire and
provides a compelling vision of what the future might hold, it’s far from
inevitable that the energy drawn to the wish image will be directed toward
making that vision a reality. It’s therefore entirely possible that Avatar – the commodity – will remain the posited
“resolution” to the desires it provokes.
In this scenario, the film
becomes a kind of repetition compulsion, an expression of capitalism’s
never-ending process of substitution and deferral (good enough, until something
better comes along). Indeed, the depression recounted by repeat viewers not
able to gain access to “the real thing” through the film suggests that no other
path seemed evident. And while – in and of itself – the film would never be
enough, most viewers were left
with nothing but consumption-related choices: watch the film again despite its
incapacity to deliver on its promise, subject the promise to forms of ironic
disavowal, or find some other consumable thing that might really do the trick.
VIII
As
expressions of our longing for redemption, wish images have often been used to
revitalize the commodity form. In order for this not to happen, it’s necessary for us to imagine how our
longing for actualization might be decoupled from consumption and reestablished
as a central category of production. As Marx noted in Capital, the definitive feature of the human labour process
is that the image of the thing to be produced exists in the mind of the
producer prior to its concretion. In that field of production known as
“politics,” this means that the wish image ceases to be a seduction (as happens
in the sphere of consumption) and becomes instead the basis for decisive
action.
It’s therefore not
surprising that Indigenous people – people for whom the connection between
politics and production often continues to be more explicit than it’s become
for the cosmopolitan inhabitants of the global North – have begun to draw upon
images from Avatar to sharpen the
focus of their confrontations with constituted power. The website Survival recently reported on several of these generative
citations.16
In one report, a Penan man
from Sarawak recounted how “the Na’vi people in ‘Avatar’ cry because their
forest is destroyed.” According to the interview subject, the situation for the
Penan was the same, since “logging companies are chopping down our big trees
and polluting our rivers, and the animals we hunt are dying.” Similarly, a
Kalahari Bushman described how Avatar “shows the world about what it is to be a Bushman, and what our land is
to us. Land and Bushmen are the same.” Other groups have gone still further by
transposing the film from the register of generative analogy into that of
resource for action.
Appealing
to James Cameron for assistance through an ad placed in the film industry magazine Variety, the Dongria Kondh tribe in India highlighted the
connection between Avatar and
their own struggle against Vedanta Resources, a mining company determined to
extract bauxite from their sacred mountain. Acting even more directly, a group
of Palestinian protestors in Bil’in recently dressed up like Na’vi to highlight
the connection between the struggle on Pandora and their own experience of
dispossession.17 In an uncanny instance
of art-imitating-life-imitating-art, IDF soldiers were
captured on film firing tear gas at the demonstrators. In this way, the
structural analogy between Israel and Avatar’s “sky people” became irrefutable.18
But despite these creative
appeals to the film’s resonant images (appeals that have come from Indigenous
people themselves), many radicals continue to be reluctant to acknowledge the
film’s importance. To be sure, there have been some notable exceptions: Evo
Morales welcomed Avatar as a
“profound show of resistance to capitalism and the struggle for the defense of
nature.” Similarly, in an overwhelmingly positive report for
socialistworker.org, Nagesh Rao concluded that it was significant that
“millions of moviegoers around the world are flocking to a film that
unflinchingly indicts imperialism and corporate greed, defends the right of the
oppressed to fight back, and holds open the potential for solidarity between
people on opposite sides of a conflict not of their choosing.”19 Nevertheless, within North American radical scenes,
assessments such as these have remained rare.
IX
Why?
In order to answer this question, it’s necessary to highlight the numerous ways
in which the film’s representation of people in struggle differs sharply from
radical ideals. Along with its suggestion that people with disabilities
(should) want to be “cured” and its uncritical woman-as-prize plot device, Avatar infuriates us because the oppressed Na’vi are
exoticized and incapable of saving themselves. Worse, the film relies upon the
heroic intervention of a white outsider to bring resolution. Annalee Newitz did
much to stimulate discussion about the latter frustration with her influential
“When Will White People Stop Making Films Like ‘Avatar,’” an article first
published on the website io9.com.20 In
that piece, Newitz proposes that Avatar, like Dances With Wolves,
is best understood as a fantasy about race told from the perspective of white
people. According to Newitz, “these are movies about white guilt.”
Our main white
characters realize that they are complicit in a system which is destroying
aliens, AKA people of color – their cultures, their habitats, and their
populations. The whites realize this when they begin to assimilate into the
“alien” cultures and see things from a new perspective. To purge their
overwhelming sense of guilt, they switch sides, become “race traitors,” and
fight against their old comrades. But then they go beyond assimilation and
become leaders of the people they once oppressed.
Newitz concludes that this
is “the essence of the white guilt fantasy.” In her account, this fantasy
involves more than the desire to be absolved of crimes or to join the side of
the righteous; instead, “it’s a wish to lead people of color from the inside
rather than from the (oppressive, white) outside.” In other words, according to
Newitz, Dances With Wolves and Avatar encourage white people to imagine that it’s possible
to simultaneously be absolved of their guilt while maintaining a version of the
superiority and privilege associated with their current position.
These dynamics will no
doubt sound familiar to many radicals (indeed, Newitz’s article circulated as
broadly as it did precisely because it rang so true). And there’s no doubt that
the fantasy of painless redemption described in the piece constitutes a real
obstacle to meaningful solidarity. It’s therefore both surprising and
unfortunate that, when measured against the issues she’s highlighted, Newitz’s
proposed resolution falls as flat as it does. “I’d like to watch some movies
about people of color (ahem, aliens), from the perspective of that group,
without injecting a random white (erm, human) character to explain everything
to me,” she reports.
Science fiction is
exciting because it promises to show the world and the universe from
perspectives radically unlike what we’ve seen before. But until white people
stop making movies like Avatar, I fear that I’m doomed to see the same old
story again and again.
How are we to understand
these comments? First, Newitz positions herself as a connoisseur of radical
difference. Next, she notes that the repetition compulsion that overtakes white
people while working through their fantasy of overcoming guilt without losing
status prevents her from realizing her own desire. In other words, the
unacknowledged preoccupation with white guilt (a phenomenal experience with an
incontestable material basis) gets in the way of realizing the desire to
indulge in the pleasure of unmediated engagement with the Other. The logical –
but politically untenable – resolution to the problem therefore must be:
overcome guilt! Enjoy what the universe has to offer! What at first appeared to
be a radical critique thus turns into a reiteration of pedestrian
multiculturalism.21
X
Newitz
hits the mark when she claims that Avatar provides a clear view of white people’s racial fantasies. However, her
injunction to simply produce films that “show the world and the universe from
perspectives radically unlike what we’ve seen before” leaves the problem
unresolved. This is because white people’s compulsion to tell the same story
over and over again corresponds directly to the unresolved nature of the
material circumstances in which they find themselves. Or, more directly:
because white people are guilty, it’s inevitable that knowledge of that guilt
will return like a repressed phenomenon – even if only in symptomatic form.
Consequently, until we find a means of resolving the history of injustice and
oppression we’ve contributed to or benefited from, any “overcoming” will be
nothing more than deferral. But why do white fantasies take people of colour as
their object?
In order to answer this
question, it’s useful to begin by noting, as David McNally does, that
“bourgeois culture is constituted in and through a process in which bodiliness
is ascribed to outcast others…”
Bodies appeared
outside bourgeois society, therefore, as attributes of foreign or alien social
types. These non-bourgeois others … were feminized, racialized, and animalized…
All of these bodies underwent simultaneous processes of sexualization and
degradation.22
Obverse to the
racialization and animalization of people of colour, Europe’s white bourgeois
subjects began to envision themselves in increasingly omniscient and
disembodied ways. Modelled after the Christian mystery, which posits spirit as
residing in but not being of the body, Richard Dyer notes that this conception of
whiteness impelled those possessed by it toward unattainable transcendental
omniscience (what McNally, later in his analysis, calls “idealist
abstraction”).23 The fact that such
transcendence
is – practically speaking – unattainable did not prevent white people from
becoming disconnected from the ground of corporeality.24
By imposing a constitutive
tension in being, the spiritual conceits of whiteness have historically
stimulated a tremendous capacity for limited forms of self-realization.
However, they have also produced a systemic anxiety that cannot be resolved
within the terms available to whiteness itself. In response, and in an effort
to “resolve” the anxiety brought on by their premature and always-partial
ascendance to the universal, white people have often developed a chronic desire
for gross particularity.
Given their association
with the body in the white imagination, it’s hardly surprising to find that
people of colour have been enlisted as the imagined resolution to white lack.
Whether in the moment of domination (where the deference of the dominated
confirms the being of the dominator) or of romantic allure (where the posited
corporeality of the person of colour is invested with the power to save those
who have lost their way), people of colour – as categorical abstractions – have
offered the same respite to white people that commodities have offered to
capitalist consumers more generally. In the moment of their “consumption,” they
are substitute objects, deferred actualizations.
Anti-racist theorists have
been right to point out that white people’s racial fantasies are harmful to
those they take as their object. However, these fantasies must also be
understood as wish images. Although distorted by their immersion in the sphere
of consumption, these images denote a legitimate desire to overcome
capitalism’s expulsion of the body. In this way, they lay claim to the promise
of a mythic past – a moment before the fall – when human experience was
envisioned as whole. Marking the highpoint of the historical division between
mental and manual labor, such reconciliation is impossible in the bourgeois
world.
To the extent that it
rehearsed these racial fantasies, and to the extent that these fantasies
resonated with people, Avatar
provided an opportunity for radicals to turn identification with the film into
disaffection with the world. Even at its worst, the film’s contradictions
invited us to pry it apart, to wrest the desire that animates consumption from
the inevitable limits of the consumed object itself. Had we proceeded in this
way, we could have begun to
incite change through the illumination of what Marx described as “mystical
consciousness that is unintelligible to itself.” From there, we could have highlighted the extent to which “the world has
long dreamed of possessing something of which it has only to be conscious in
order to possess it in reality.” That “something” is a world free of
exploitation, a world where, through activity, people themselves put an end to
repetition and deferral.
For the most part, however, radicals left mystical consciousness to its own devices.25 We were not prepared to harness the massive public interest in Avatar